Cryptography and Network Security Chapter 18

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Chapter 15 - Electronic Mail Security

Despite the refusal of VADM Poindexter and LtCol North to appear, the Board's access to other sources of information filled much of this gap. The FBI provided documents taken from the files of the National Security Advisor and relevant NSC staff members, including messages from the PROF system between VADM Poindexter and LtCol North. The PROF messages were conversations by computer, written at the time events occurred and presumed by the writers to be protected from disclosure. In this sense, they provide a first-hand, contemporaneous account of events.

—The Tower Commission Report to President Reagan on the Iran-Contra Affair, 1987

Email Security

- regarded network services
- > currently message contents are not secure
 - may be inspected either in transit
 - or by suitably privileged users on destination system

Email Security Enhancements


- ➤ confidentiality
 - protection from disclosure
- **>** authentication
 - of sender of message
- > message integrity
 - protection from modification
- ➤ non-repudiation of origin
 - protection from denial by sender

Pretty Good Privacy (PGP)

- widely used de facto secure email
- developed by Phil Zimmermann
- selected best available crypto algs to use
- integrated into a single program
- on Unix, PC, Macintosh and other systems
- originally free, now also have commercial versions available


PGP Operation – Authentication

- 1. sender creates message
- 2. make SHA-1160-bit hash of message
- 3. attached RSA signed hash to message
- 4. receiver decrypts & recovers hash code
- 5. receiver verifies received message hash




PGP Operation – Confidentiality

- 1. sender forms 128-bit random session key
- 2. encrypts message with session key
- 3. attaches session key encrypted with RSA
- 4. receiver decrypts & recovers session key
- 5. session key is used to decrypt message



PGP Operation – Confidentiality & Authentication

- can use both services on same message
 - create signature & attach to message
 - encrypt both message & signature
 - attach RSA/ElGamal encrypted session key




PGP Operation – Compression

- by default PGP compresses message after signing but before encrypting
 - so can store uncompressed message & signature for later verification
 - & because compression is non deterministic
- uses ZIP compression algorithm

PGP Operation – Email Compatibility

- when using PGP will have binary data to send (encrypted message etc)
- · however email was designed only for text
- hence PGP must encode raw binary data into printable ASCII characters
- uses radix-64 algorithm
 - maps 3 bytes to 4 printable chars
 - also appends a CRC
- PGP also segments messages if too big

PGP Operation – Summary




PGP Session Keys

- need a session key for each message
 - of varying sizes: 56-bit DES, 128-bit CAST or IDEA, 168-bit Triple-DES
- generated using ANSI X12.17 mode
- uses random inputs taken from previous uses and from keystroke timing of user


PGP Public & Private Keys


- since many public/private keys may be in use, need to identify which is actually used to encrypt session key in a message
 - could send full public-key with every message
 - but this is inefficient
- rather use a key identifier based on key
 - is least significant 64-bits of the key
 - will very likely be unique
- also use key ID in signatures



PGP Key Rings


- > each PGP user has a pair of keyrings:
 - public-key ring contains all the public-keys of other PGP users known to this user, indexed by key ID
 - private-key ring contains the public/private key pair(s) for this user, indexed by key ID & encrypted keyed from a hashed passphrase
- rivate keys thus depends on the pass-phrase security





PGP Key Management

- · rather than relying on certificate authorities
- in PGP every user is own CA
 - can sign keys for users they know directly
- forms a "web of trust"
 - trust keys have signed
 - can trust keys others have signed if have a chain of signatures to them
- key ring includes trust indicators
- · users can also revoke their keys



S/MIME (Secure/Multipurpose **Internet Mail Extensions)**

- security enhancement to MIME email
 - original Internet RFC822 email was text only
 - MIME provided support for varying content types and multi-part messages
 - with encoding of binary data to textual form
 - S/MIME added security enhancements
- have S/MIME support in many mail agents
 - eg MS Outlook, Mozilla, Mac Mail etc

S/MIME Functions

- · enveloped data
 - encrypted content and associated keys
- signed data
 - encoded message + signed digest
- clear-signed data
 - cleartext message + encoded signed digest
- signed & enveloped data
 - nesting of signed & encrypted entities

S/MIME Cryptographic Algorithms

• digital signatures: DSS & RSA

• hash functions: SHA-1 & MD5

session key encryption: ElGamal & RSA

• message encryption: AES, Triple-DES, RC2/40

and others

MAC: HMAC with SHA-1

• have process to decide which algs to use

S/MIME Messages

- ➤ S/MIME secures a MIME entity with a signature, encryption, or both
- > forming a MIME wrapped PKCS object
- ➤ have a range of content-types:
 - enveloped data
 - signed data
 - clear-signed data
 - registration request
 - certificate only message

S/MIME Certificate Processing

- S/MIME uses X.509 v3 certificates
- managed using a hybrid of a strict X.509 CA hierarchy & PGP's web of trust
- each client has a list of trusted CA's certs
- and own public/private key pairs & certs
- certificates must be signed by trusted CA's

Certificate Authorities

- have several well-known CA's
- · Verisign one of most widely used
- Verisign issues several types of Digital IDs
- increasing levels of checks & hence trust


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S/MIME Enhanced Security Services

- 3 proposed enhanced security services:
 - signed receipts
 - security labels
 - secure mailing lists


Domain Keys Identified Mail


- a specification for cryptographically signing email messages
- · so signing domain claims responsibility
- recipients / agents can verify signature
- proposed Internet Standard RFC 4871
- has been widely adopted



Email Threats

- see RFC 4684- Analysis of Threats Motivating DomainKeys Identified Mail
- describes the problem space in terms of:
 - range: low end, spammers, fraudsters
 - capabilities in terms of where submitted, signed, volume, routing naming etc
 - outside located attackers





Summary

- have considered:
 - secure email
 - PGP
 - S/MIME
 - domain-keys identified email