the cost and effectiveness of blending attacks against mixes

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- mixes can be vulnerable to blending attacks
 - threshold mix flood
 - timed mix trickle

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- threshold pool mix - flood (uncertain)

bad implementation of mixes can greatly reduce anonymity

- problem:
 - how well will blending attacks perform against different mixes?
 - how much anonymity can mixes provide with blending attacks present?
 - are there other attacking schemes that may put mix network at risk?

objective

 explore existing blending attacks against mixes and evaluate their performance

 measure different mixes' resistance to blending attacks

 try to reveal more weakness of mixes / mix network, if possible

approach

simulate the behavior of mixes and a global active attacker

 measure attacking effectiveness by cost and accuracy

compare between different mix types and attacks

possible experiments

- what will happen if the environment is more favorable to the attacker?
 - small number of mixes
 - specific network topology
 - preknown information

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questions