In this class, we often express cryptologic operations in terms of a formal notation. This section contains an overview of notation associated with cryptographic transforms (Section C-1) and cryptosystems that incorporate such trnsforms (Section C-2). In Section C-3, we discuss information-theoretic concepts of data security, and summarize high-level formalisms associated with cryptanalysis in Section C-4.
Observation. If |Y| > |X|, then we call the output of TE a homophonic cipher.
Definition. A decryption transform TD : GY × K -> FX, where K denotes the keyspace and G = F or X = Y is usual. Here, the input of TE is ciphertext and the output is plaintext.
Observation. Let k K
and plaintext
a
FX.
It is customary that a =
TD(TE(a)).
such that a = TD(TE(a)),
for all aP.
Observation. Let us call the two parties conversing over a secure channel Alice and Bob, and the adversary will be named Oscar. The paradigm for secure communication with cryptographic protocols is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Alice sends a message a to Bob over an insecure
channel as ciphertext c, with a key sent to Bob over a secure
channel. Meanwhile, Oscar listens to the insecure channel, which he
can intercept. The dotted line indicates that Alice controls the keysource.
This concludes our discussion of cryptosystems for this class. Additional statistical concepts will be defined as they are introduced in theory development.
[Mau91] Maurer, U.M. "A universal statistical test for random bit generators", In A.J. Menezes and S. A. Vanstone, Eds., Proceedings CRYPTO 90, Springer Lecture Notes in Computer Science 537:409-420 (1991).
Copyright © 1996 by Mark S. Schmalz, All Rights Reserved