

"Get in Researchers; We're Measuring Reproducibility": A Reproducibility Study of Machine Learning Papers in Tier 1 Security Conferences

Daniel Olszewski University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA dolszewski@ufl.edu

Kevin Warren University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA kwarren9413@ufl.edu

Divyajyoti Ukirde University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA divyajyotiukirde@ufl.edu Allison Lu University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA allison.lu@ufl.edu

Cole Kitroser University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA colekitroser@ufl.edu

Kevin Butler University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA butler@ufl.edu Carson Stillman University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA carson.stillman@ufl.edu

Alejandro Pascual University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA alejandropascual@ufl.edu

> Patrick Traynor University of Florida Gainesville, FL, USA traynor@ufl.edu

ABSTRACT

Reproducibility is crucial to the advancement of science; it strengthens confidence in seemingly contradictory results and expands the boundaries of known discoveries. Computer Security has the natural benefit of creating artifacts that should facilitate computational reproducibility, the ability for others to use someone else's code and data to independently recreate results, in a relatively straightforward fashion. While the Security community has recently increased its attention on reproducibility, an independent and comprehensive measurement of the current state of reproducibility has not been conducted. In this paper, we perform the first such study, targeting reproducible artifacts generated specifically by papers on machine learning security (one of the most popular areas in academic research) published in Tier 1 security conferences over the past ten years (2013-2022). We perform our measurement study of indirect and direct reproducibility over nearly 750 papers, their codebases, and datasets. Our analysis shows that there is no statistically significant difference between the availability of artifacts before and after the introduction of Artifact Evaluation Committees in Tier 1 conferences. However, based on three years of results, artifacts that pass through this process work at a higher rate than those that do not. From our collected findings, we offer data-driven suggestions for improving reproducibility in our community, including five common problems observed in our study. In so doing, we demonstrate that significant progress still needs to be made in computational reproducibility in Computer Security research.

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CCS '23, November 26–30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark

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CCS CONCEPTS

General and reference → Measurement; Validation;
 Computing methodologies → Machine learning; Cross-validation.

KEYWORDS

reproducibility; machine learning; security; meta-science

ACM Reference Format:

Daniel Olszewski, Allison Lu, Carson Stillman, Kevin Warren, Cole Kitroser, Alejandro Pascual, Divyajyoti Ukirde, Kevin Butler, and Patrick Traynor. 2023. "Get in Researchers; We're Measuring Reproducibility":

A Reproducibility Study of Machine Learning Papers in Tier 1 Security Conferences. In *Proceedings of the 2023 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS '23), November 26–30, 2023, Copenhagen, Denmark.* ACM, New York, NY, USA, 27 pages. https://doi.org/10.1145/3576915.3623130

1 INTRODUCTION

Advances in science do not come solely from novel exploratory studies. As pointed out in a recent report by the National Academy of Sciences [443], scientific progress requires confirmatory research to validate and expand the limits of new knowledge. This observation has crucial importance across all branches of science and engineering and makes it clear that closing the gap between initial discovery and widespread adoption of claims or methods requires significant effort to be spent on reproducibility. As a result of prioritizing exploratory over confirmatory studies, diverse fields ranging from medicine [184, 256, 591] and economics [122, 239], to chemistry [16, 219] and psychology [35, 126] have suffered very public and damaging reproducibility crises.

Research in Computer Science, and Computer Security specifically, have a rare advantage in their ability to create reproducible science. Specifically, because much of the work in our community produces computational artifacts as a side-effect of their methodology (e.g., code, data, and figures), the ability to perform confirmational studies should be strictly simpler than fields in which

methods are less portable, potentially dangerous, or more expensive (e.g., recreating an experimental pharmaceutical compound and testing it on a large population). An increasing number of papers appear to be making their code available to the broader community as a means of supporting such analyses; however, outside of largely anecdotal evidence, a comprehensive study of the availability of artifacts and the ability of independent researchers to confirm their computational reproducibility has not been conducted in our community. Without such a study, it is unclear if Computer Security is truly creating reproducible and ultimately broadly applicable science, or if it is having a reproducibility crisis of its own.

In order to better characterize the current state of computational reproducibility in Computer Security, we perform an extensive measurement study and make the following contributions:

- Comprehensive Longitudinal Study: We perform the largest known longitudinal study of reproducibility in the Security community. We focus on the sub-discipline of machine learning (ML) security as published at Tier 1 security venues over the past 10 years, yielding observations over a total population of nearly 750 papers. We find that 60% of these published papers do not include code to run their experiments. Moreover, 56% of the provided artifacts do not run at all.
- Measure Impact of Artifact Evaluation Committees:
 Using data collected from the longitudinal study, we analyze whether the introduction of artifact evaluation committees in 2020 has had an impact on the availability of code artifacts. We show that there is no statistically significant difference between the two groups, meaning that Artifact Evaluation Committees have yet to achieve their intended goals.
- Recommendations Based on Measurement: We highlight five recommendations based on the most common problems that we observe in our analysis that impeded both our indirect and direct reproducibility studies. We believe that explicitly addressing these issues will result in a substantial improvement of reproducibility in Tier 1 Security conferences.

Computational reproducibility efforts are often discounted in their value when compared to exploratory/novelty-focused papers, as the former often requires less time or expense than their exploratory counterparts. We note that conducting this study required extensive resources and time, with an estimated 8 person-years of effort and well over 10,000 hours of computational time to recreate results. Only through such comprehensive measurement and analysis of our community can actionable steps for improvement be offered.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background information including explicit definitions of reproducibility; Section 3 states our null hypothesis; Section 4 details our research questions and methodology; Section 5 discusses the results and implications of our Indirect Reproducibility study; Section 6 presents the observations and results of our Direct Reproducibility study; Section 7 provides discussion of critical issues and offers recommendations based on our observations; Section 8 presents limitations of our study and future considerations; Section 9 highlights related work from a broad set of communities; and Section 10 provides concluding remarks.

2 BACKGROUND

We briefly discuss the formal study of reproducibility and current artifact evaluation in the Security community.

2.1 Reproducibility

Although *ACM* harmonized its definition of reproducibility in 2020 [1], we use the National Academy of Science's definition [60, 443] for computational reproducibility, replicability, and generalizability and discuss the nuances between each.

Computational Reproducibility: Computational reproducibility (i.e., reproducibility) refers to recreating a study's results with the study's artifacts. Thus, reproducibility occurs when an independent team can obtain consistent results using the same data, computational environment, and code [212]. Reproducible results confirm that the phenomenon described by a paper is present under the study's environment. Further, bit-wise reproducibility entails reproducing the exact numeric results. Oftentimes, this strict definition is relaxed, albeit marginally, for areas that rely on complex computational processes or use some modicum of randomness (e.g., machine learning).

A computational reproducibility study can be either *indirect* or *direct*. An indirect study assesses whether the authors of a study made their artifacts available. It considers the transparency of the study and thus requires fewer resources to conduct. A direct study runs, if available, the same code, data, and analytical methodology to check that running the provided code recreates the results of the paper. This inherently requires a greater amount of resources. In this paper, we conduct both a direct and indirect study to understand and measure the current state of computational reproducibility within the Security community.

Replicability: While computational reproducibility uses the same code and data for a study, *replicability* studies seek to address the same research question with different methodologies. Using different collected data, a replicability study aims to confirm the results of a previous study, subject to the inherent uncertainty of the underlying studied system. Due to the statistical nature of observation, a failure to replicate a study does not necessarily mean that the original study's results are false, nor does success indicate that the original study's results are true. Replicability is achieved through numerous attempts that provide a preponderance of evidence for the existence of the observed phenomenon.

Generalizability: All scientific exploration occurs in some unique environment. *Generalizability* defines how the identified trends apply to other unique environments [60]. There are numerous reasons a study may not generalize. An unsuccessful attempt to show generalization may not come from the study but from outside conditions adversely affecting the underlying system. Similarly to replicability, generalizability is not shown by a single study, but by numerous studies across multiple conditions that collectively show the same phenomenon.

2.2 Artifact Evaluation

Conferences seek to address concerns about reproducibility by providing artifact evaluation committees (AECs) and giving authors

¹It is important to note that errors within the computation are not addressed. Bad code that leads to erroneous claims will propagate throughout a reproducibility study.




Figure 1: The pipeline for the methodology of our study. We collect machine learning papers from the Tier 1 Security conferences. Then we perform an indirect study of each paper considering the availability of the Method, Data, and Experiment. Finally, from the available Data and Experiments, we run a direct study running their code to attempt to recreate their results.

the option to submit to their call for artifacts. The committee accepts everything including tools, test suites, models, proofs, and even videos of the artifact working to evaluate whether the artifacts are consistent with the claims or procedures of the associated paper [313]. These committees award badges depending on the success of running. *USENIX Security* as of 2023 assigns three badges: *Artifact Available* where some portion of the artifact is publically available; *Artifact Functional* where the artifact runs; and *Artifact Reproduced* where the artifact directly reproduces the results of the paper.

While these committees face many issues [48], AECs are becoming increasingly popular in many communities [678]. In 2017, both WiSec and ACSAC added artifact evaluations committees after calls from the community [50, 454]. Of the Tier 1 conferences, USENIX Security introduced its AEC in 2020, and CCS introduced its AEC in 2023. As of the time of writing, NDSS and IEEE S&P have not introduced AECs. Although outside the scope of our work, it is important to note that NeurIPS open-sourced the reproducibility of papers in a reproducibility challenge [485]. However, unlike NeurIPS, Tier 1 Security conferences do not require artifact evaluation. As such, this inherently affects the state of reproducibility. We aim to provide an analysis of how AECs have affected reproducibility in Section 6.

3 H₀ NULL HYPOTHESIS

A null hypothesis, along with an alternative hypothesis, conjecture relationships about a population. These hypotheses are tested against a statistical model of collected data to show statistical significance. A null hypothesis claims that there is no causal relationship resulting in differences between two subpopulations and that any observation is due to random chance. The alternative hypothesis is the inverse stating that there is a statistically significant relationship. Although traditional work considers a p-value less than 0.05 as statistically significant, modern experts in the "post p < 0.05" era encourage classifying 0.005 as merely "suggestive" and <math>p < 0.005 as beginning to indicate statistical significance [49]. We state the null hypothesis for this paper as:

 H_0 · There is no difference in whether code from published papers is available before vs after the introduction of AECs to Tier 1 Security Conferences (2020).

4 METHODOLOGY

To understand the current state of reproducibility in the Security community, we conduct a measurement study where we collect machine learning papers from the Tier 1 conferences over the past 10 years. We select this sub-community because it is large and long-lived. Moreover, it requires less specialized equipment than other areas (e.g., wireless) giving us the best opportunity to capture reproducible science. In this section, we outline what criteria a paper must meet to be considered a part of this study and how we analyze each paper according to its Method (i.e., a complete description of its methodology), Data, and Experiment (i.e., code), outlined in Figure 1. We perform both an Indirect and Direct Study of reproducibility. We propose the following research questions to guide our study:

- **RQ1** (Indirect Study) Do studies provide the details of their method?
- RQ2 (Indirect Study) To what extent is collected data made available? Where are studies sourcing their data?
- **RQ3** (Indirect Study) To what extent are experimental artifacts made available?
- **RQ4** (Direct Study) Of available experimental artifacts, how many run and produce consistent results?

4.1 Paper Selection

We consider papers from the four Tier 1 Security conferences (*ACM-CCS, IEEE S&P, NDSS*, and *USENIX Security*) ranging from the years 2013 to 2022 (10 years). We exclude all workshops associated with each conference as well as any poster talks. As we aim to quantify the state of reproducibility in machine learning security, we attempt to select every paper that uses ML in its system design.

To make this process as objective as possible, we select papers according to the following criteria: (1) machine learning is mentioned in the Abstract, Introduction, Background, Methodology, or Conclusion; (2) the paper creates a training procedure based on data available to the study authors, usually mentioned in the Methodology or Results section (e.g., "We train a multi-layer perceptron on our collected data."); (3) their Results section clearly outlines a metric for an ML model that is not from previous work (e.g., "Our RFC classifier achieves 99% accuracy"). We enact a consensus protocol where each year is reviewed by two separate team members. Each reviewer independently applies the selection criteria to find a list of papers, and we take the union of the two lists of papers. Note that our selection process goes beyond AECs and considers every published paper at the conference. After applying our criteria for inclusion in this study, we identify 744 papers. We make all of our data available², which includes a list of the papers and all of their associated URLs.

4.2 Indirect Study

After finalizing the list of papers, we evaluate each paper according to its Method, Data, and Experiment. Previous work [50, 212, 496] reinforces that these three factors are the foundation for reproducibility analysis. We outline in detail the factors and each variable in Table 1 and discuss them in the following sections. Each paper is reviewed twice in the Indirect Study. The Indirect Study only

 $^{^2} https://github.com/reproducibility-sec/reproducibility\\$

Factor	Variable	Description
	Model	What model did it use?
Method	Set Up	Were the hyper-parameters
		described?
	Training	Does it explicitly outline its
		training?
	Available	Is the data made available?
Data	Reason	If not, why is it not provided?
		Is the data split into
	Data Split	training/validation/test
		in a deterministic way?
	Available	Was the code made available?
Experiment	Instructions	Does the code have explicit
		instructions on how to run?
	Trained	Is there a trained model?
		Is there training code?
	Works	Does the code work based on
		the instructions? Was further
		coding needed?
		What is the output of the code?
	Output	Does it match the metrics
		in the paper?
	Results	Is the code output consistent
		with the claims of the paper?

Table 1: An outline of the factors, variables, and details we use to analyze each paper. The three factors are Method, Data, and Experiments. Each variable represents a column in our data frame and forms the foundation for our study.

assesses the availability of the identified factors. We do not run any code during the Indirect Study. A measure for inter-rater reliability is Cohen's Kappa coefficient, which balances the agreement between two raters against the random chance that they would agree. Generally, a Cohen's Kappa coefficient above 0.7 is considered acceptable for inter-rater reliability, and our resulting Cohen's Kappa coefficient is $\kappa=0.83$.

Method: To understand how well a paper describes its methodology, we recreate the experimental procedure to replicate the results. We aim to measure the presence of model descriptions as it is essential to both reproducibility and replicability studies. This constitutes the first part of our indirect reproducibility study. When we evaluate a paper on its Method, we consider three factors. First, we look at what model is used. If the paper does not outline its analysis model, we fundamentally cannot recreate its results. Second, we consider if all of the hyperparameters are described. Many ML models consist of numerous parameters (e.g., number of nodes, activation functions, loss functions) required for similar performance. We consider this on a numeric scale of no description (0), partial description (1), and complete description(2) of hyperparameters. Finally, we want to understand the paper's training procedure. A lack of a training procedure further inhibits any reproduction of its results. The training procedure is also measured on a scale similar to the hyperparameters.

Data: For the second part of our indirect reproducibility study, we evaluate the data on whether it is publically available and if it is

split into train, validation, and test sets in an explicit way. Studies often use multiple datasets which can be either publically available or private. We consider that there are reasons why the data is not released and note that in the Reason variable. The data being available does not immediately mean the results are reproducible. Thus, we want to identify when a paper ensures that the data is used correctly.

Experiment: In machine learning papers, the experiment is often a computational procedure that is run through code. While running the code, a model is trained on processed data, evaluated on test data, and outputs a metric for performance. The previous two factors we study are important and affect computational reproducibility, but the majority of our analysis comes from evaluating the experimental artifacts. For our indirect study, we assess how often code is made available for a paper. We consider not only if the authors link a repository in the paper, but also if we can locate the artifacts online. We do this by searching the paper's title in a search engine and crawling the authors' websites.

4.3 Direct Study

The indirect study evaluates the availability of analytical methodology, data, and experimental artifacts. In contrast, the direct study aims to evaluate the efficacy of the available artifacts for recreating the results. Not only do we evaluate if the artifact is available, but we also evaluate the instructions to run the artifact, whether there is a trained model or training code available, if the artifact runs, if the output of the artifact is the metric in the paper, and that the results are consistent with the paper's claims. When artifacts are available via an online repository, we download the repository to our servers. Following the ReadMe we try to run the code, then in cases where we are required to request access, we do so.

If we are unable to immediately run the code based on the ReadMe, we spend at most one-hour debugging or setting up the project. This is similar in a time scale to Collberg et al.'s [127] methodology, which only evaluated whether artifacts compiled. If we are unable to run the artifact code after an hour of setup and debugging, we mark it as not working. Some projects provide the code to train their model but not the model they previously trained. Due to the scope of our study, we disregard the recommended training time as some require months of computational training time. We train the model for 10 hours and then perform its evaluation procedure, if available. We recognize this as a limitation and further discuss it in Section 8.2. After evaluation, we consider a result reproduced if we get within 5% of the claimed metric, similar to Raff [495]. Raff's study replicated the experiments by the paper's described methodology and create their own code to do so. They do not rely on the artifacts of the paper. As such, 5% is more generous in our reproducibility study, since we are running the authors' code.

Some artifacts require special architectures to run (e.g., GPUs). We run every model on a CPU unless a special architecture is specified by the authors. The results of the direct study for each artifact are reviewed by another reviewer. We run the experimental artifacts once unless, when the artifacts did not run, the second reviewer identifies a possible workaround. We accept the most positive result for the artifact. Following this methodology, we




Figure 2: A modified Coxcomb plot that summarizes the indirect study of hyperparameters. A Coxcomb is a bar graph in polar coordinates. Thus, the radius depicts the count of papers in a category. For example, we find that of the 232 papers we consider at *USENIX* 88 describe their hyperparameters, 56 partially describe them, and 88 do not describe them.

analyze over 298 code repositories constituting *over 8 person-years* worth of work and over 10,000 hours of computation time.

5 INDIRECT STUDY

We discuss the indirect study by analyzing the availability of the Method, Data, and Experiment. Each subsection outlines the importance of the factor, the results from our Indirect Study, a case study that includes examples of the presence of the factor, and lessons of the results.

5.1 Method

The method of a study is the fundamental process of evaluating a study. Accurate and complete descriptions of how the analytical methodology is conducted aid reviewers and readers in understanding the study. For recreating the machine learning security papers, we are primarily interested in two aspects, the hyperparameters of their model and the associated training mechanisms. The hyperparameters dictate the details of their model (e.g., the number of layers in a deep neural network). Changing any hyperparameter alters the underlying algorithm, and thus, inhibits reproducibility. The training mechanism outlines how to run the underlying algorithm (e.g., specifying the number of epochs to train for). Changes in how models are trained can result in different models. We measure both of these attributes on a scale of Not Described, Partially Described, and Described.

We find that of the 744 papers we look at, 312 papers fully described their hyperparameters, 165 partially described their hyperparameters, and 267 did not describe their hyperparameters. Figure 2 shows our results for the hyperparameters. We see that in *USENIX*, *S&P*, and *NDSS* there is an even split between not described and fully described at approximately 38% each, with the remaining






Figure 3: A modified Coxcomb to summarize the indirect study of training methodologies. We find that 77% of the papers we consider describe or partially describe their training procedures. 168 papers (23%) in our study did not describe their training procedure.

going to the partially described. However, at *CCS* the number of Described is double that of the Not Described. Figure 3 shows the results of analyzing the training mechanisms. We find that of the 744 we look at, 410 papers described their training, 166 partially described their training, and 168 did not describe their training (**RQ1**). **Case Study**: There are many ways to thoroughly explain hyperparameters and training procedures. Oesch et al.'s *That Was Then, This Is Now: A Security Evaluation of Password Generation, Storage, and Autofill in Browser-Based Password Managers* [455] contains a detailed table in the appendix that lists all of the hyperparameters for their model. This is a succinct way to outline all associated hyperparameters.

Training procedures do not require extensive discussions, but it is important to list the associated parameters. Chen et al.'s *On Training Robust PDF Malware Classifiers* [114] outlines how they train their neural networks by listing the number of epochs, the batch size, the optimizer, and the learning rate. When using cross-validation, it is important to discuss the number of cross-validation folds and how they are chosen. Siby et al.'s *Encrypted DNS* \Rightarrow *Privacy? A Traffic Analysis Perspective* [566] uses 10-fold cross-validation describing exactly how they split the dataset to validate their model. We label papers as a partial description if they lack a stopping procedure, the number of epochs, or underdefined a procedure (e.g., "we performed cross-validation").

Lesson: While there is a considerable amount of work that provides an adequate discussion of their hyperparameters and training procedures, we find that there are improvements to be made. The papers with the best discussion of hyperparameters include a table with the full model hyperaparameters, as well as outlining how they




Figure 4: A summary of the data availability found in our indirect study. Approximately one out of every three studies collect data but do not make it available. 35% collect data and make it available. Every conference demonstrates the same trend where there are approximately an equal number of papers that make data available, do not make data available, and use publicly available data.

choose the parameters (e.g., grid-search). Similarly, the best discussions on training procedures include an explicit training paragraph or section that explicitly details the training algorithm.

5.2 Data

Machine learning works by training on data, and thus data availability directly affects the reproducibility of a study. We categorize the data availability broadly into three categories: No Data Available is assigned when the paper collected data and did not make it available or when there is no avenue for accessing the data (e.g., a broken link); Data Available is used when a study collects their own data and makes it publically available; Public Data Only is when a study only uses previously published and accessible datasets.

Figure 4 summarizes the results of our Indirect Study. We find that approximately 36% of studies collected their own data and did not make this publically available, 36% collected data and made it available, and 28% of studies conducted their experiments on publically available data (**RQ2**). We see similar trends across *USENIX*, *CCS*, and *S&P* where the Data Available is larger than the No Data provided. However, *NDSS* has more No Data provided than Data Available. When the data was not available, only 10% of papers gave a reason with 7% working with sensitive data (e.g., personally identifiable information) and 3% working with proprietary data (e.g., collected malware intrusions). Approximately 90% of papers (243 of 269) that did not make their data available did not indicate as to why it was not available.

Case Study: Datasets require significant work and funding to create. Zheng et al.'s *Characterizing and Detecting Non-Consensual Photo Sharing on Social Networks* [768] created a dataset that depicts unaware people in a photo. This dataset contains 6,437 photos that




Figure 5: A representation of the papers within our study that made artifacts available. Only 298 of the 744 papers (40%) provide artifacts. About 1% of the total papers remain as request access. The remaining 59% (441 of 744) of papers did not provide any artifacts with their study.

are labeled by three users from a user study. The dataset is available online to promote future work in the area. Das et al.'s The Web's Sixth Sense: A Study of Scripts Accessing Smartphone Sensors [137] crawled 3,695 websites to detect when a website accessed device sensor data on mobile devices. They collect and provide data in both the United States and Europe. The online repository contains the javascripts that they found, as well as the features of each script, the assigned cluster, and aggregations across the various sensors. Further, in the repository's ReadMe, they connect each file to the methodology that created it in their paper (e.g., "using the methodology described in Section 5"). Although these two papers provide complete datasets, other studies only provide a small subset of their data. This helps to understand the data collected, but ultimately cannot lead to reproducibility. Finally, a different study cited a dataset that has multiple versions without specifying which one, while another study released its raw data but not its processing script or how it chose a train/test split.

We find that about 28% of the studies used publically available resources. The datasets range from static datasets such as CIFAR10 [314] and MNIST [326] to databases that are continuously updated like the OpenSky Database [526]. Using publically available datasets allows for benchmarking and direct comparison between systems.

Lesson: While we recognize that not every dataset can be made available, 36% of collected data remains inaccessible. This creates problems for future research such as a lack of benchmarks when trying to compare the same data, slowing the growth of future research on similar problems, and lack of validation of the dataset. Data collected to support one's argument should be made fully available, when possible. To the best of their ability, authors should make their data available including both processed and unprocessed versions, and when unable to, discuss why they cannot.

5.3 Experiment

The last part of the Indirect Study is assessing to what extent studies make their experiment (i.e., code) available. The results can be seen in Figure 5. We find that approximately 60% of papers (446 out of 744) did not provide code to run their experiments, 39% (298 out of 744) provided code, and approximately 1% still remain as request access. 3 *USENIX, CCS*, and *NDSS* contain approximately 1.5 times more papers without code than with code. There is an equal split between no code and code for S&P (**RQ3**). Interestingly, we find approximately 1% of papers state that their code will be available in the future or link an empty repository in their paper (even years after their publication).

Case Study: Of available artifacts, 95% are available via GitHub. 4% are websites hosted Google Sites or Google Drive links, and the remaining 1% are hosted at universities. Often the link is in a footnote in the paper. Some treated their repository as a citation, and the link is in the references section. We find that if the citation is ambiguous we often did not find it on the first pass (e.g., "We get 90% accuracy[0]." and the reference says "[0] - ToolName. link."). Pasquini et al.'s Improving Password Guessing via Representation Learning [477] cite the artifact, but it is explicitly in a section labeled "Availability". While generally if there are artifacts that exist but are not linked in the paper, we could find them via the authors' websites or searching sites like GitHub. However, for one outlier case, there was no code linked in the paper or the authors' websites, but we found a link to the artifact website in a Twitter thread.

Lesson: Not providing the experimental code limits the extent that future work can improve on new tasks and compare against the technique. Further, complex pre-processing tasks, novel analysis techniques, and complicated system designs are non-trivial to build from scratch. Providing implementations not only improves the state of reproducibility but allows further development of these techniques. We further discuss the state of the available experiments in Section 6.

6 DIRECT STUDY

A direct reproducibility study seeks to understand if the available experimental setup will allow us to recreate the results of the work. Building upon the indirect study, we take the papers that made its artifacts available and attempt to run them. In this section, we summarize the results of our direct study on the 298 papers that have available experimental artifacts.

6.1 Results

We find that we are unable to get 56% of the artifacts to run. Although the results show that 44% of repositories run, this does not depict the full story. With only 20% of the repositories running with the same results, the remaining 22% either recreate different results (4%) or execute but are missing arguments or outputs (18%). We can see this relationship in Figure 6 where the results are grouped by conferences. *USENIX* had 92 papers with code where 53 did not run, 21 recreated the claimed results, 3 did not create the same results, and 16 were missing parameters, files, or outputs. *CCS* contained

Experimental Success




Figure 6: The number of experimental successes for the papers in experiment availability which their artifacts available. Only 20% of the available artifacts run and recreate the results claimed in the paper. 53 of the 92 papers (58%) at USENIX, 30 of the 61 papers (49%) at S&P, 53 of the 96 papers (55%) at CCS, and 30 of the 49 papers (61%) at NDSS did not run. Code not running is the dominant occurrence amongst papers that made artifacts available, which is a common trend across all conferences.

96 with code where 53 did not run, 19 recreated the results, 3 did not create the same results, and 22 were missing parameters. *S&P* had 61 papers with artifacts where 30 did not run, 11 recreated the same results, 1 did not create the same results, and 20 were missing parameters. *NDSS* had 49 papers where 30 did not run, 8 recreated the same results, 4 did not produce the same results, and 8 were missing parameters. A commonality across all conferences is that *over half* of all papers that make code available do not run. We observe artifacts missing parameters from a variety of areas such as output, arguments to run the commands, or data not being included(**RQ4**).

There are many factors that affect the running of an artifact including the clarity of the instructions, what is available in the repository, and what the code outputs. Figure 7 visualizes five factors that we noticed while running the repositories. Specifically, we look at the clarity of the ReadMe, whether the code works out-of-box, the output of the code, the train-test splitting, and if they included a trained model.

ReadMe: The ReadMe is the foundation for experimental artifacts. They inform about the purpose of the artifact, how to set up the repositories, what commands to run, and changes that can be made. 57% of the artifacts possess a ReadMe that offers instructions and necessary environments. Some artifacts provide directions for reproducing its results. For instance, the ReadMe for Mehnaz et al.'s *Are Your Sensitive Attributes Private? Novel Model Inversion Attribute Inference Attacks on Classification Models* [408] contains a section dedicated to reproducibility, and following the ReadMe reproduces their results. 30% of the repositories lack concise instructions or

³Papers remain as request access until we acquire access to their experiments. Then, we change the paper to a code available paper. Note some request access have been waiting for months.




Figure 7: Visualization of the five factors we notices while running repositories: the quality of the ReadMe, whether the code works out-of-box, if the output matches the study's claims, whether the train/test splitting is deterministic, and if they included a trained model. We notice that outside the Readme, the other four factors resulted in the majority of papers failing to meet their requirements.

dependency descriptions. One problem we encounter is that some artifacts require specific package versions but do not specify which one. Others require a preprocessing step that is either not specified or made available. While 87% of the ReadMe's contain some information, we find that 13% contain nothing in the ReadMe besides a title. In these cases, we try to run any file that could lead to reproducibility (e.g., eval_results.py), but often we cannot run the artifact. In one example, the artifact contains 70+ files with no instructions on how to run. Further, when we opened main.py, the file is commented out.

Out-of-Box: While 42% of the artifacts run, most do not run immediately. Only 28% of the available code repositories work by either following the instructions or, in the absence of instructions, by running the main file. When it did not run immediately, sometimes we could get it to work by installing further packages, changing paths or directory structures, or fixing errors that appear. Repositories that immediately work often limit the number of commands required to run, provide a setup script, or provide a Docker image or virtual machine.

Output: When we gauge the reproducibility of a paper, we try to compare the output of an artifact with the study's claim, yet only 43% of the available repositories match its output to the claims made in the associated paper. In the instances where the output does not match, the code often analyzes small examples, demonstrates the system, or is a library. While the artifacts provide code, they often do not provide meaningful output. For example, one paper claims a performance boost in its system design, but the experimental code outputs "DONE!". It did not generate any files or any other output for further analysis. Further, correcting the output in most of these repositories is a non-trivial task requiring an expert understanding of the codebase, naming schema, and techniques applied.

Train/Test: As machine learning models learn from a training set, an artifact should use the same training set. We find that 22% of the artifacts determine their train, validation, and test sets in a deterministic way. Artifacts where the code specifically delineates the train and test sets usually place them in separate directories or the data contains a column that denotes which set the sample belongs to. Without clear separation of the train, validation, and test sets we are unable to accurately reproduce their results, though sometimes we can get close. Further, data availability affects our ability to reproduce results. If they do not include their complete data, scripts to process the data, or scripts to collect the data, we will not be to reproduce their results. For example, while one repository contains a detailed ReadMe with well-marked instructions for every file and how to reproduce their results, there is no collected data and the data collection scripts require access to a \$1,000 oscilloscope.

Trained Model: Most machine learning algorithms are stochastic as they seek to find an optimal solution to a problem and thus add an element of randomization [205]. This directly affects an algorithm's reproducibility and can be simply alleviated by providing a trained model. While 17% of artifacts include a trained model, some papers provide both a trained model as well as code to re-train their model. For instance, Bollinger et al.'s *Automating Cookie Consent and GDPR Violation Detection* [61] provides extensive documentation on how to train their model or run the results with one of the trained models in the repository. We could reproduce their results in less than 10 minutes of work.

6.2 Statistical Analysis

In Section 3, we discussed our null hypothesis: There is no difference in whether code is available before and after the introduction of AECs to Tier 1 Security Conferences (2020). In this section, we conduct a statistical test to either accept or reject H_0 .

Permutation Testing: We use the non-parametric statistical test, permutation testing because it does not require assumptions on the underlying distribution of the data. The test works by simulating multiple permutations of the data across the two groups, calculating the average distribution within the simulated permutations, taking the difference between the two groups' averages, and then calculating the proportion of samples with a higher difference than the true sample. We take the proportion of papers that make their code available against the papers that do not in a given year. We then separate the years into two groups, before 2020 (year < 2020) and after (year \geq 2020). We simulate 10,000 permutation distributions and calculate a p = 0.068, thus we accept the null hypothesis, H_0 . While traditionally some scientists may have tried to argue that this is highly suggestive of significance, a modern interpretation requires a p-value significantly less than 0.05 to imply even a weak relationship. The *p*-value is close to indicating that there is a suggestive relationship between introducing the AECs and the availability of code, but it does not nearly meet the threshold to do so. In accepting the null hypothesis, we must therefore conclude there is no statistically significant difference between code artifacts produced before and after AECs were introduced to Tier 1 Security conferences.

While we do accept the null hypothesis, we recognize that the introduction of AECs was only three years ago. As such, we look at the quality of artifacts at *USENIX* from 2020 through 2022, as seen in Figure 8. There are not enough samples to test for statistical significance within the *USENIX* AEC; however, anecdotally, we notice that papers submitted to the AEC have a higher likelihood of working. Based on these observations, we believe that further inclusion of AECs in Tier 1 conferences may further increase not only the availability of artifacts but also artifacts that reproduce results claimed in the associated paper. So while it has yet to fully demonstrate its desired impact, gathering more data points on the AEC across multiple conferences will allow a better evaluation of the impact the experiment has had on computational reproducibility in the Security community.

6.3 USENIX Security 2022 Artifact Evaluation

USENIX started its artifact evaluation in 2020 with 40 artifacts submitted and 38 passing [79]. The badge awarded was the Artifact Evaluated. In 2021, USENIX awarded 34 of the 37 submitted artifacts with the same badge [209]. In 2022, USENIX changed its badge awarding process. For the 114 papers submitted, it awarded one or more of Artifact Available (107), Artifact Functional (98), and Artifact Reproduced (65) [70]. We aim to understand how AEC assign badges. Further, USENIX made the artifact appendices (i.e., instructions to recreate) available for all papers submitted to its AEC as well as the badges associated with each paper [406]. While this is a step towards transparency, they do not provide an analysis of how the AEC determined each badge. We follow the submitted artifact appendix for each paper that overlaps with our indirect study for a total of 21 papers. Two papers only made their data available to the AEC as it was sensitive user data, thus we do not include them in our analysis. Of the 19 remaining papers, we find that we can recreate 15 of the paper's badges (i.e., when following the artifact




Figure 8: An overview of the impact the AEC has made on artifact availability and code running for papers submitted to *USENIX* over the past three years. We see an increase not only in the number of papers submitting artifacts but also a notable increase in the total number of papers that actually run when submitted to the AEC. Additionally, the number of papers that had artifacts but did not submit to the AEC has steadily decreased to the point of being less than the AEC submission.

appendix, we agree with 15 of the paper's badges). There are 4 papers for which we cannot recreate the badges.

Most of the cases where our evaluation differed from the AEC consisted of two issues: permission issues and package problems. In the case of permission issues, either data was unavailable for privacy or access control purposes or the commands to grab given to the AEC required permissions are given to the committee but not to the general public. Package problems are twofold, either code written with imports that were not designated for installation or make files that were out of date and errored out. There was a single case where the AEC did not give a tag that we did, which was an availability tag.

Based on the difference between our tests and the AEC, the most common issue is that code, packages, and make files are sensitive to updates and changes and there is no real incentive for any code to be maintained once it is accepted into a conference. In most cases, the setups were not a complete failure and usually failed toward the end of the installation process. Many of these systems would benefit from a pre-made instance (e.g., Docker or VM) since the installation processes were quite complex and it would guarantee resiliency to the constantly updating versions of packages.

Our study consists of papers published in the past 10 years. The number of ML papers published at Tier 1 security conferences has been steadily rising since 2013. Figure 9 shows the number of papers considered by year and conference. As the number of ML papers




Figure 9: The change of experimental results across 10 years for each conference. As time progresses, we see that the number of papers considered in our study and the total number of papers with artifacts grows. The artifact evaluation committee (AEC) that *USENIX* started in 2020 influenced both an increase in the number of artifacts and the proportion of artifacts that worked.

increases, there is an increase in the number of available artifacts. *USENIX*'s AEC was introduced in 2020, and it appears that this improves the code availability throughout the conference.

6.4 Academia and Industry

Past studies looking at systems research have observed low reproducibility among papers with authors from Industry [127]. To date, no one has performed a similar analysis in the Security community. We are unable to make any claims relating to this as Industry-related papers only account for 6% of the papers in this study. However, we understand that there are legitimate reasons companies or academics may not wish for every paper to be reproducible (e.g., private data, startups, or intellectual property). A larger discussion on the role of intentionally not publishing artifacts (e.g., intellectual property concerns, data sensitivity, etc) and how the community should collectively decide to evaluate the claims of those papers in relation to work with reproducible artifacts, should be had.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

While there are numerous issues that we see throughout the direct study, we discuss five of the most common problems that we faced.

7.1 Packaging and Dependencies

The most common problem we face when running artifacts is maintaining consistent packages and dependencies as the artifact. Often, a specific version is not declared, and the current stable version does not work. However, this is not the only problem. Certain packages became deprecated or were no longer maintained resulting in numerous errors and hours of finding a workable version (e.g., Tensorflow 1 was deprecated in 2018). As such, tools like *pip* will not install it, yet we find that repositories from as late as 2022 still used a deprecated Tensorflow version. The install scripts or environments in the artifacts using this version did not properly set up the dependencies, forcing us to install it from the source. Other times the artifacts required unmaintained repositories and the current version is unstable with logged issues.

Lesson: When an artifact relies on complex dependencies or uses tools maintained by outside entities, there is an inherent risk that future work will not be able to use those artifacts. Special care is needed to identify what requirements an artifact needs and specify versions of any outside dependencies or packages.

Recommendation: It should be a standard practice to set a requirements.txt file with explicit version control with every repository and researchers need to be more consistent with providing selfcontained environments (e.g., Docker images or Virtual Machines) to avoid issues with deprecation.

7.2 Incomplete Files or Data

A complete artifact contains every file required for running the code. This includes the data, preprocessing scripts, training scripts, and evaluation scripts. Often, the repositories were missing numerous files. As discussed in Section 6.1, the data availability adversely affected the reproducibility, but the missing data is not the only problem. We often saw repositories calling for functions that exist in a file that was not in the repository. We saw numerous spelling errors in the code, uninstantiated arrays, or call functions that were commented out. Some repositories provide the raw data but do not provide the labels or preprocessing scripts. Consequently, we are unable to reproduce their results. We saw numerous artifacts call on pre-trained models that were missing in the repository with no designation on how to acquire them. One repository even left coding the experiment for reproducing the results as something for the end-user to do. They provided the functions, data, and an outline to recreate the results but no script to do so.

Lesson: An artifact is only reproducible when all files required to do so are available. Scripts that contain bugs, call functions that do not exist, or rely on data not in the repository are difficult, if not impossible, to reproduce.

Recommendation: When creating a repository for a project, researchers should keep all files in a single location instead of requiring the end user to collect additional files from multiple locations. Additionally, if the community embraces artifact evaluation more, we can guarantee that research papers will have an instance where their work is not missing necessary files or code.

7.3 Incomplete Instructions

We outline in Section 6.1 the importance of ReadMes. While some ReadMe's contained no context or instructions, others are convoluted with excess information or instructions that are out-of-order. These instructions often called for confusing steps that should be unnecessary (e.g., changing every file path from a hardcoded, absolute path to our own absolute path). Another repository required root access, because it hardcoded an absolute path in their artifact. We find that some repositories never include the preprocessing of the data as an instruction. Yet further examples never mentioned running the script that labels the data for supervised learning.

Lesson: The steps involved to run a repository are often complex and cumbersome requiring non-trivial steps to get them to work. A lack of straightforward explicit instructions further complicates the effort required to run the artifact.

Recommendation: Each Readme should contain, at a minimum, a step-by-step set of instructions that explicitly give the exact commands necessary to run their system. If there are variable options to the command, an example should always accompany the command framework. Researchers should test that a non-expert can run their artifact solely based on the instructions that they provide.

7.4 Complex Hardware Setup

The designed systems often require a specific hardware setup both for collecting the data and running the system. In the case of collecting the data, we see that artifacts often do not include the selected data, requiring us to run their collection scripts. When the scripts use hardware that we do not have access to, we are unable to reproduce the results. When the artifact itself requires a complex hardware system to train, we struggle with setting up the system or adapting to the existing architecture that we have.

Lesson: While complex hardware improves performance or collects interesting data, by placing the burden on future work without consideration, it greatly increases the difficulty of reproducibility. Recommendation: For specialized setups, the researchers should be aware that the reproducibility of their work is especially difficult if they fail to provide necessary factors such as their data. If data is collected with atypical hardware, when applicable, that data should be made available as an artifact of the paper.

7.5 Not Designed for Reproducibility

Finally, not all artifacts are designed for reproducibility. We often saw repositories that include examples, demonstrations, tools, or more supplementary information for the paper. As discussed in Section 6.1, the output did not match the claims in the paper 57% of the time. Artifacts often produced examples or online tools that allowed us to run a sample against their system (e.g., decompiling a binary), but we could not feasibly craft the output to reproduce their performance evaluation.

Lesson: Creating reproducible experiments is a conscious choice authors must make in computational sciences reflected in the state of their artifacts.

Recommendation: When approaching making projects reproducible, researchers need to ensure that every claim that is made in the paper can be reproduced in the artifact they release. Outputs to their code should be the table and data-driven figures that appear

in the paper whenever possible. Researchers should be proactive and build their projects with reproducibility in mind for the design.

8 LIMITATIONS AND OPEN CHALLENGES

To encourage reproducibility in future work, we discuss the limitations of reproducing our study, further limitations within our study design, and the plethora of future work that exists in this area.

8.1 Reproducing Our Work

This body of work consists of over eight person-years of work from a large research team. We recognize that reproducing our work would take similarly significant time and resources. Furthermore, our work is inhibited by the fact that we cannot openly share a repository that has every paper's code and data. First, we do not own the code and are restricted by licenses for sharing their repositories. Second, most online repositories have a limit on the memory size of a repository. Including all 298 repositories of code exceeds this limit.

While we cannot avoid the above problems, we provide all of our processed data in a CSV in our repository. This CSV contains every paper, a URL link to the paper, a URL link to the code if one exists, and our coding of each paper. We also provide the scripts to create each figure in this paper, and we strongly encourage the reader to download and run our scripts to ensure that our figures are re-creatable from the data.

8.2 Limitations

To the best of our ability, we tried to limit biases and identify limitations. We acknowledge that there are still several biases and limitations and discuss them in this section.

First, selection bias could exist within our work. We do our best to systematically pick papers as noted in Section 4, and further confirm the selected papers by having a consensus with two reviewers. Further, our research questions are aimed at answering the state of reproducibility in machine learning at Tier 1 conferences in the Security community. There are possibly papers that we miss in our analysis due to our methodology. We also note that there are some code repositories that we may have missed. While we do our best to find online repositories that are not connected to the paper, our search is not exhaustive and some repositories may be left out.

Second, we recognize that parts of our analysis are subjective (e.g., what one reviewer considers as missing hyper-parameters may not be the same for another reviewer). We limit this by relying on objective measures as much as possible (e.g., paper X was missing the activation function) to inform a scale of the presence of a feature in our coding (e.g., instead of a binary class on whether paper X had hyper-parameters, we use varying degree). Further, there is a risk for any reviewer to favor negative results as that creates more interesting results [127, 443]. Thus, we accept the most positive result we can for a paper.

Finally, running, and in some cases training, multiple machine learning models is computationally and time intensive. We limit the amount of time a model was trained to 10 hours, and how much time we spend on debugging or attempting to set the repository up to one hour. We recognize that these limitations exist despite our best ability to limit them.

8.3 Open Challenges

One of the most significant but not discussed challenges to reproducibility comes in the form of funding for research. Often after papers are published, funding sources change and there are simply no means by which older projects can continue to be financially supported. Moreover, students and employees often move on to new positions, making it especially challenging to maintain complex research software in the long term. One potential means of improving outcomes in this space is making it easier for Funding Agencies to identify artifacts early and point their authors towards programs like the US National Science Foundation's "Transition to Practice" track. Additionally, authors should consider making their papers "reproducible by design", ensuring that artifacts are packaged into self-contained environments (e.g., Docker instances, VMs) whenever possible. Finally, we by no means recommend that significant effort be put into resurrecting the papers that we were unable to reproduce in this study; rather, effort and funding are likely better spent in making sure that future contributions improve their relative reproducibility.

While Section 2 clearly delineates the differences between reproducibility, replicability, and generalizability, our study focuses solely on the first of these goals. Studies into the latter two areas are extremely important and worth the attention of the community; however, due to their potential scale (e.g., collecting fundamentally new datasets), future studies may need to be even more narrowly scoped than our study of machine learning security. Lastly, as mentioned early in this work, we are unable to consider the correctness of implementations in this study - only the performance of available code to reported values. There is substantial research work to be done in this space that would result in significant improvement in the trust of research claims made by our community.

9 RELATED WORK

Our study is the first reproducibility study to *comprehensively* measure the reproducibility of machine learning in the Security community. We perform both an indirect and direct study of reproducibility that serves as the foundation for reproducibility studies in Security, complementing a vast swath of work in similar fields. We outline notable contributions in different areas and differentiate our work from previous work.

Computer Science: Prior reproducibility studies in computer science evaluated the availability of artifacts in venues such as *IEEE Transactions of Signal Processing* [634], *AIS International Conference of Information Systems* [496], and various *ACM* journals and conferences [127]. The indirect studies found that in 2004 only 9% of 134 considered papers had code and 33% provided a dataset [634], which improved to 28% of the 100 papers evaluated in 2019 providing code [496]. When directly studied, only 32% of considered papers in 2014 could be compiled within 30 minutes [127]. However, they did not evaluate whether the artifact recreated the results claimed in the paper.

Machine Learning: Machine learning is subject to the same concerns of reproducibility, if not more so[211]. Randomness greatly influences the performance of machine learning models [25], and only 8% of 45 evaluated papers between 2015 and 2018 discussed how randomness affected their model [363]. Even more worrisome,

11 of 12 reproduced recommender systems were outperformed by conceptually simpler models over multiple splits of the dataset [177]. Further compounding this issue, only 25% of papers published at *AAAI* and *IJCAI* in 2013 to 2016 described their method in a reproducible way [212]. Though, Raff [495] found that they could replicate results from described methodology 62% of the time looking at 255 papers from 1984 to 2017. While the extent of availability of artifacts has been observed in other conferences, our study is more comprehensive with a larger scope in Tier 1 conferences that have not been considered before.

Security: As noted in Section 2.2, calls for better reproducibility in the Security community have made slow changes to conferences. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, there are only two studies on reproducibility in the Security community that attempt to measure this problem. Van et al. [633] looked at 50 systems security papers from USENIX, CCS, NDSS, and S&P in the years 2010 and 2015. Their paper primarily focused on benchmarking flaws in the papers they looked at where 1 of the 5 pillars for errors was reproducibility. They found that approximately 1 out of 4 papers did not specify their platform or their software version. Hamm et al. [215] looked at 61 user studies from Usenix, CCS, and S&P from 2013 to 2018. They found that 51% of the papers offered up the questionnaire used in the user study and none provided the full response data. Both of these studies are indirect studies. Our paper expands beyond both of these papers in both scope and depth. We consider 744 papers and evaluated the papers in both an indirect and direct study.

10 CONCLUSION

Academic research often prioritizes novel, exploratory research. However, without reproducible science, the widespread adoption of new ideas and their transition to practice can be severely degraded. Measuring where our community stands in terms of reproducible science is crucial to making recommendations that meaningful help to normalize such contributions. We perform the first such longitudinal study of computational reproducibility in Computer Security research, investigating both indirect and direct reproducibility over a decade of publications. To our knowledge, our study is the most comprehensive reproducibility analysis of our community in size by at least an order of magnitude. Our results show both that making working artifacts available is not yet a priority of the community and that having artifact evaluation committees and badging may be leading to improvements.

Most critically, we show that common platitudes regarding reproducibility (i.e., "Just make code available") fail to meaningfully move our community forward. Instead, where making artifacts public is possible, researchers should focus on improving the five most-common issues preventing their work from being reproduced: packages and dependencies, incomplete or missing files/data, incomplete or confusing instructions, distribution of artifacts from complex hardware setups, and not designed for reproducibility. While other issues beyond the control of individual researchers still exist (i.e., funding for the continued maintenance of said artifacts, legal limitations on distributing code and/or datasets, etc), we believe that addressing these issues will help to make more papers "reproducible by design".

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A APPENDIX

A.1 List of Papers We Analyze by Year

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